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COMMENT/Federalism and Criminal Law-
A National Standard?
"... . so that today the question is whether the constituent states of the system can be
saved for any useful purpose and thereby saved as the vital cells that they have been
of democratic sentiment, impulse and action."'
THE HISTORICAL DICHOTOMY Of the state and the national government is cur-
rently undergoing transition. While neither the executive, 2 legislative nor
judicial4 branches of the national government can be singled out as the pri-
mary catalytic agent, this redefinitional process is readily identifiable in the
decisions of the Supreme Court. Indicative of the Court's "starring role" in
the reexamination of the federal structure of the nation, are its activist ap-
proaches in the areas of commerce, 5 reapportionment" and obscenity.7 The
'CORWIN, THE PASSING OF DUAL FEDERALISM, ESSAYS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
164 (1964).
'The State of The Union-Address By The President of The United States, H.R. Doc. No.
1, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1967). President Johnson noted in part that:
Federal energy is essential. But it is not enough. Only a total working partnership
among Federal, State and local governments can succeed....
During the past three years we have returned to the State and local governments about
$40 billion in grants-in-aid.... With Federal assistance, State and local governments
by 1970 will be spending close to $110 billion annually. These enormous sums must be
used wisely, honestly and effectively.
We intend to work closely with the States and the localities to do exactly that.
11112 CONG. REC. 6501 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1966) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
Creative Federalism is not a political manuever to make the States and their localities
financially dependent on the national government. On the contrary, its financial con-
tribution is merely a response to the staggering fiscal burden under which these juris-
dictions presently labor....
Finally, creative federalism is not concerned with the dialogue of States' rights or local
rights versus centralized Federal power. This debate belongs to the past. Rather, it
accepts the expanding role of State and local governments to take on greater political
and administrative responsibilities as the Nation grows. At the same time, it relies on
a strengthened Federal role to provide new ideas, incentives, and resources to the States
and the localities to meet common goals.
' Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 56 (1963). Justice Goldberg writing for the
majority of the Court, saw the problem as:
Cooperative federalism where the Federal and State governments are waging a united
front against many types of criminal activity.
5 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), posited the commerce debate as a question
involving interstate as opposed to intrastate commerce. Yet, as the commerce issue continued
to be clarified by the Court, it was decided that intrastate commerce, having a significant
affect on interstate commerce, would also be subject to national regulation. Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942);
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1953); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons
v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966), rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1966).
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national acceptance of the Court's intrusion in these areas, arguably the
exclusive preserves of the states or the other branches of the federal govern-
Early in the commerce debate, areas of state interests because of their relationship to
problems affecting commerce, were also placed under national control. Mintz v. Baldwin,
289 U.S. 346 (1933), declared that congressional intent to supercede state regulation had to
be clearly stated. Later cases were not so. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605
(1926), found the Court overruling a New Jersey statute regarding the inspection of loco-
motives. Also, Terminal Ass'n. v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 8 (1943).
In Erie R.R. v. People, 233 U.S. 671 (1914), the Court held that a State law involving
the allowable hours of service of railway employees, was precluded by the passage of the
Federal Hours of Service Act of 1907.
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Warren-Goodwin Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919), sustained
federal preemption of the field of telegraphic communication.
Navigation-United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1941), held that
the commerce power of the national government not only pervaded the area of waterway
traffic control but also gave the national government power over watershed development,
flood protection and the right to recovery of the necessary costs of these projects through
the utilization of the power which was the by-product of the general use of the waters of
commerce.
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913), held, on the strength of the commerce
clause, that Wisconsin legislation copying the Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915,
§ 1, 34 Stat. 768, was invalid, as rights under the federal act might be destroyed by similar
state regulation.
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), decided that the commerce
clause reserved power over local milk markets to congressional regulations.
This collection of cases is by no means complete. Its purpose was merely to underscore
the many areas of local interest which are now subject to federal control.
I Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), held that it was the job of the Congress to
determine if the government of the state was of republican character. This, however, did
not prevent the Court from refereeing the internecine squabbles of state executive and
legislative branches of government apportionment schemes. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355
(1932); Koening v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932). Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946), saw the Court reasserting its historical indifference to the
problem of the consistency of State electoral systems, stating: "Whether Congress faithfully
discharges its duty or not, the subject has been committed to the exclusive control of Con-
gress." Only in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (1960), did the high Court intrude
but then only on the grounds that the redistricting involved violated the due process clause,
observing: "[The] Court has never acknowledged that the States have the power to do as they
will with a municipality regardless of the consequences." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
reversed the Court's past policy of nonintervention by qualifying the power of the Congress
to review the form of state government under the guaranty clause, by subjecting state elec-
toral districts to the test of the equal protection clause. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568
(1963), expanded the scope of Baker deciding:
... as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the
seats of both houses of a bicameral legislature be apportioned on a population basis.
To counter the Court's decisions in this area, Senator Dirksen introduced, S. REs. No. 103,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). In the final voting on the resolution however, Senator Dirksen's
resolution failed to pass sixty-five to thirty-eight. 112 CONe. REc. 8184 (daily ed. April 20,
1966).
7 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). In this case, Justice Brennan observed:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited
area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is
the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.
Also, Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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ment, has equipped the Court with a general demeanor of self assurance and
has facilitated examining areas of the law previously beyond its purview.
One of these areas is criminal law. This article will view the vitality of the
nation's historic federal system of laws and law enforcement practices in
light of the recent developments in criminal law and the formulation by the
Court of minimal standards for certain state and federal procedures of crim-
inal justice.8 First we shall examine the initial efforts of the Supreme Court
aimed at securing for itself the role as interpreter of the Constitution. Next,
a synopsis of early cases, in which attempts were made to identify the con-
sistency of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution as interpreted by the
Court, will follow. Finally, the article will proceed along the battle lines of
the debate concerning an incorporative theory of interpreting the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment and the result of that debate as seen
through the developments in constitutional criminal law today.
It is the object of this article, to identify some of the significant opinions
of the Court which have all but eliminated a federal theory of law enforce-
ment at the present time. By tracing the cases which have resulted in the
current concentration of near exclusive power over the administration of
criminal justice by the Supreme Court, perhaps the judicial factors involved
in the disintegration of the nation's historical federal structure will become
clearer.
The approach of this essay, from the olympian heights of Supreme Court
decisions, ought not be interpreted as a subtle indictment of the states for a
lethargic response to the current debate over historical federalism. 9 Rather,
this tact was adopted from a melange of practical considerations. Federal
opinions were the most numerous and most conveniently available of the
materials treating the area under investigation.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall had the unenviable task of promulgating and
securing the position of the Supreme Court in the affairs of the nation. Gib-
bons v. Ogden,o while not his first attempt, is perhaps his most significant
effort in this respect. In this opinion, he laid to rest any doubts as to the de-
mise of Jeffersonian 1' Constitutional Theory. Congress had enacted a law
but it was the Court's task to determine the constitutional validity of the
legislation passed. While reemphasizing the Court's interpretive function,
Marshall also continued his limitation of state powers in this case as he had
done in McCullochU2 by first recognizing:
I Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
9Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1966, at 18. The emphasis in the article is on how difficult
federal aid is to pass up.
1" Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 5.
"SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON 21-23 (1st ed. 1949) (abridged edition).
I McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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... the genius and the character of the whole government seems to be, that its
action is to be applied to all external concerns of the nation, and to those which
reflect the State's generally; but not those within a particular state.18
Marshall then qualified the forgoing deference to state affairs by then recog-
nizing that the federal government did possess the power to interfere with
the internal affairs of the states "for the purpose of executing its general
powers."'1 4 Aside from the constitutional scrutiny of the Court it thus appear-
ed that the survival of a state's power lay solely within:
... the wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people,
and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this as in
many other instances-the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure
them from abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely
solely.'8
While Marshall's opinions were geared towards establishing the role of
the Court and the supremacy of the national government, the succeeding
Chief Justice Taney of Maryland, stressed the arbitral function of the Court.
The Court's status was akin to that of a referee of a battle between two po-
tentates wherein:
This Judicial power was justly regarded as indisputable not merely to maintain
the supremacy of the laws of the United States, but also to guard the States from
any encroachment upon their reserved rights by the general government... de-
ciding in the peaceful forms of judicial proceeding, the angry and irritating con-
troversies between two sovereignties, which in other countries have been deter-
mined by the arbitrament of force. 16
Taney did not negative the Court's hard won role of constitutional inter-
preter but did retreat on the territory of states' rights by postulating a duality
of governments. A power basis for either legislative or judicial action posited
on the ambivalent foundation of "the letter and the spirit of the Constitu-
tion,"'7 was now severely constricted.
This coexistence of equal powers thesis survived until the 1930s. Then,
despite the forebodings of Mr. Justice Sutherland that the problems before
the Court were "all local evils over which the Federal government has no
legislative control,"' 8 the Court approved the Congress' reaction to the na-
tion's economic and social disorders in United States v. Darby.'9 In sustain-
ing the Court's action in this case, Mr. Justice Stone utilized Marshall's in-
' Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 10, at 195.1 Ibid.
Id. at 196-97.
18Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
1
'
7 McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 12, at 421.
Is Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936).
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
(Vol. xvi
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terpretation of the necessary and proper clause in McCulloch20 and Mar-
shall's characterization of the commerce clause in Gibbonsal and found the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,22 constitutional. The power of the Su-
preme Court, enunciated in McCulloch and Gibbons, and anesthetized by
Taney until the 1930s, was resurrected. The problem facing the Court, and
still vexing the Court today, was to determine the occasion and manner of
the exercise of this power.
In criminal law, the debate over the occasion and manner of the exercise
of the power possessed by the Supreme Court, might be termed as the battle
of the exclusionists28 and the inclusionists. 24 Was it quite clear that "there is
a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a state ... that it is
only the former which are placed ... under the protection of the Federal
Constitution?" 25 Or was it not a fact that because of the privileges and im-
munities clause of the fourteenth amendment:
A citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States residing in a state.
The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities... now belonged to him as
a citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of
any State. 26
The battle lines had been drawn before the passage of the fourteenth
amendment by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore.2 7
The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United
States for themselves, for their own government and not for the government of
the individual States. 28
To Marshall's mind:
... had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the
20 McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 12.
mGibbons v. Ogden, supra note 10.
29 U.S.C. § 201 (1964).
'Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1883); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1903);
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875): Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (13 Wall) 36 (1872).
" O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 361 (1891) (Justice Field).
The privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States are such as have
their recognition in or guaranty from the Constitution of the United States.
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 606, 617 (1899) (Justice Harlan) (dissenting opinion).
And while those amendments originally limited only the power of the National Govern-
ment in respect of the privileges and immunities specified therein, since the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, those privileges and immunities are, in my opinion,
also guarded against infringement by the States.
Slaughter House Cases, supra note 23, at 122 (justice Bradley) (dissenting opinion).
[I]t was the intention of the people of this country in adopting that amendment
[fourteenth] to provide National security against violation by the States of the funda-
mental rights [first eight amendments] of the citizen.
Slaughter House Cases, supra note 23, at 74.
Ibid.
1" 32 U.S. (7 Peter) 243 (1833).
21 Id. at 247.
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powers of state governments, they would have imitated the framers of the origi-
nal Constitution, and have expressed that intention.29
Despite the fourteenth amendment and opinion to the contrary, Barron's
vitality remained undiminished in the opinions of the Court concerning the
constitutional issues involved in the administration of criminal justice by
the states. Prohibited from implementing the first ten amendments as their
guide for interpreting the fundamental "privileges and immunities" of con-
stitutional weight, the Court set about formulating a suitable definition
from precedent and personal divination. These efforts were to doom fed-
eralism.
An early attempt was optimistic regarding the fact that the identification
of "what these fundamental principles are . . would be more tedious than
difficult to enumerate"' 0 The method would be confined to "the gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for de-
cision shall require." 31 When forced to delineate the extent of these basic
rights, the following explanation was proffered:
• . . not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also of the individual to con-
tract to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire use-
ful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.32
While capturing that quality of the fourteenth amendment "so elusive of
exact apprehension, "8 8 the preceding incantation hardly contributed to the
distillation of the nature and identity of those constitutionally fundamental
rights.
Perhaps the Court's hesitancy to incorporate the first ten amendments in
affecting the privileges and immunities of the fourteenth amendment, aside
from the questionable, historical dictates of Barron and its progeny, stem-
med from a distaste manifested by the Court against interfering with pe-
culiarly parochial interest of state administration of criminal justice. While
this reluctance might sacrifice individual freedoms, perhaps the Court
sensed that the "powers reserved to the states and those conferred on the
nation.., to promote the general welfare, material and moral,"3 4 became
21Id. at 250.
8*Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (1823).
"Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1878).
81 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
mTwining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1908).
8Hoke v. United States, 277 U.S. 308, 312 (1913). In sustaining the Mann Act the Court
observed:
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, State and Nation having different
spheres of jurisdiction . .. but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the
[Vol. XV1
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meaningful only in the context of an actual situation. Additionally giving
the factors:
1. law enforcement problems vary widely from State to State, as well as among
different communities within the State.8 5
2. that the Supreme Court "so far removed from the actualities of crime preven-
tion"8 6 ought not interfere where the
3. problems involved "are solely exercises in balancing the freedom of the indi-
vidual against the needs of law enforcement"8 7 as the local authorities, being
charged with the task of maintaining the security of the area, can better judge
and implement the methods and remedies necessary to affect this balance .... 88
arguably, any constitutional doubts concerning state criminal procedures
should have been resolved in favor of the states. The dangers of this pre-
sumption of validity of state criminal law enforcement practices and the re-
fusal to specify the consistency of personal, fundamental, constitutional
rights are plain. Such an approach failed to meet the challenge which the
surrender of any constitutional right entails. Given the affinity of the Court
towards expanding its power base, 9 the gravity of the individual rights in-
volved, and the inaccuracy of Justice Miller's observation in Slaughter
House that:
It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States and a
citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other .... 40
In light of national growth and concommitant interdependence of the
states, sophisticated reasoning was demanded for the perpetuation of a non-
incorporative standard of constitutional guarantees. The eventual failure
to supply the required rationale has direct bearing on the status of historic
federalism at the present time. At the very least, an opportunity had been
supplied to those interests which regarded "new limitation or restriction
... a matter of grave import, since, to that extent, it diminishes the author-
ity of the State, so necessary to the perpetuity of our dual form of govern-
ment" 41 to mold an effective standard for dual enforcement of constitutional
criminal justice. But their method of formulation of this standard based on
the gradual ascertainment of those fundamental rights: ". ..by the process
powers reserved to the states and those conferred on the nation are adapted to be
exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare,
material and moral.
Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 510 (1958).
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 436 (1948) (Justice Reed dissent).
87 Coakley, Law and Police Protection: Restriction in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Rxv.
2, 15 (1957).
28 Upshaw v. United States, supra note 36, at 417.
8 See notes 5-7 supra, and accompanying text.
,0 Slaughter House Cases, supra note 23, at 74.0 Twining v. New Jersey, supra note 33, at 92.
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of inclusion and exclusion in the course of cases as they arise," 42 made their
every decisional victory pyrrhic and the vitality of their standard ephemeral.
Their procrastination solidified the opposition and resulted in first encroach-
ment, and then preemption by the federal judiciary, of areas historically
the preserves of the States.
Barron's4 theme, concretized in Twining,44 found further expression in a
trilogy of cases spanning the years from 1937 to 1952. First, in Palko v. Con-
necticut,45 Mr. Justice Cardozo enunciated a test of constitutionality for
criminal prosecutions by posing the historic question: "Does it violate those
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our
civil and political institutions?' "4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter further refined
this pronouncement in Adamson v. California,4 7 stating:
Judicial review of that guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably
imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the
proceedings in order to ascertain whether they offend those cannons of decency
and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples
even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.48
Finally, in Rochin v. California,49 the test of criminal procedural constitu-
tionality was confined to:
... respect [for] certain decencies of civilized conduct. Due process of law, as a
historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining,
these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be
brought about by methods that offend "a sense of justice." 50
Constitutional censure, posited on rationale of incomprehensible latitude,
might conceivably have resulted in a period of vigorous Supreme Court ac-
tion. Yet in practice, the opposite held true.
The effect of Palko,51 Adamson 52 and Rochin58 on local law enforcement
practices was nugatory. This was a period of infrequent constitutional cen-
sure of state criminal proceedings. Gross misapplications of the judicial proc-
i ld. at 100.
This Court has always declined to give a comprehensive definition of it, and has pre-
ferred that its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion
and exclusion in the course of decisions of cases as they arise.
Barron v. Baltimore, supra note 27.
"Twining v. New Jersey, supra note 33.
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Id. at 328.
' 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
"Id. at 67-68 (Justice Frankfurter concurring).
"342 U.S. 165 (1952).
"Id. at 173.
Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 45.
32Adamson v. California, supra note 47.
"Rochin v. California, supra note 49.
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ess were required before the Court dared intrude.54 For the most part, "That
which in one setting constitute[s] a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking
to the universal sense of justice" and "in other circumstances, and in light
of other considerations, fall[s] short of such denial,"55 was left to the deter-
mination of the state tribunal. The duality of citizenship, and the accompany-
ing diversity of protection of the individual before the courts, envisioned in
Slaughter House, was practically speaking, realized. A catholicity of ap-
proach and of remedies in the administration of criminal justice by the
states, the tatoo of criminal systems under a federal structure of law en-
forcement, typified the prevailing concepts of criminal jurisprudence. While
this renaissance of historic federalism continued apace, in one area of the
criminal law, the seeds of its future dissipation were being sown.
This area was confessions. The confession problem illustrates many of the
salient factors relative to this examination of the waning vitality of the fed-
eral system. Again, the dilemmas of inclusion or exclusion of the first ten
amendments, the demand for parochial security versus effectuation of indi-
vidual rights protected by the national constitution, are of prime signifi-
cance. But, the confession debate is by no means limited to a function of re-
emphasis and restatement of historical controversies. Rather, the ensuing
developments in this field, brought the latent conflicts present in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice by the states and the national governments
to a point of confrontation and later, to a resolution ruinous to historical
federalism. While the debate involving the admissibility of confessions, ulti-
mately dispatched the Solomonic dicta of Mr. Justice Miller,50 the Slaughter
House opinion shaped the battle lines and outcome of this inquiry. Given
the metaphysical division of citizenship contained in this opinion which
necessitated a double standard of criminal justice enforced by two separate
but mutually interested parties, the mode of identification of the constitu-
tive elements of an admissible confession, was that of conflict, not cooper-
ation. This exclusivity of approach therefore, preordained eventual resolu-
tion in the terms of victory rather than compromise. Possibly the tension
caused by the confession problem, might have resulted in mutual efforts of
discovery and effectuation of federal constitutional guarantees by the states
and the national governments. Yet, the persistent refusal of jurist past and
present, as illustrated by the confession debate, to limit the restrictions of
the past to the realm of history rather than precedent, destroyed any possi-
bility of formulating proper criminal procedure for administering consti-
tutional criminal justice by both the state and the federal judiciaries. This
"Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
51 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
50 Slaughter House Cases, supra note 23.
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obstinancy resulted in the present concentration of power over criminal
justice in the national government alone and has all but demolished the
function of local courts as controlling and effective administrators of crimi-
nal justice. More important, this demotion of the states of servile status in
regard to the administration of criminal justice has eliminated our histori-
cally federal approach to criminal jurisprudence.
From its inception, the inquiry into the proper method of determining
the admissibility of a confession, proceeded along exclusionist lines. Only
in Brain v. United States,57 was the question "whether a confession is incom-
petent" regarded as an issue "controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amend-
ment... commanding no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. s58 Later cases ignored this precedent, concentrating rather on fur-
ther elucidation of the purposes of the admissibility rule in terms as:
... the aim of the rule that a confession is admissible unless voluntarily made is
to exclude false evidence. Tests are involved to determine whether the induce-
ment to speak is such that there is a fair risk that a confession is false. 59
The effectuation of this aim was left to the individual states who possessed:
... the right to prescribe the tests governing the admissibility of a confession.
In various states there may be various tests. But when... the question is prop-
erly raised as to whether a defendant has been denied the due process of law guar-
anteed by the Federal Constitution, we cannot be precluded by the verdicts of a
jury from determining whether the circumstances under which the confession
was made were such that its admission in evidence amounts to a denial of due
process.6 0
While the overtones of this type of constitutional reversal might be inter-
preted as the resurrection of Marshallian nationalism, the states felt secure
in their belief in the continued vitality of the nation's federal approach to
law enforcement. As long as the red-herring of incorporation of the first ten
amendments was absent from any Supreme Court censure of state criminal
procedure, little hostility greeted the opinions of the Court.
This myopic disregard of the dangers to a federal type enforcement and
administration of criminal justice inherent in the "accordian-like qualities
of this philosophy"6' of implementation of the fourteenth amendment due
process guarantees through "the voluntariness test" against the states, was
matched by the development of the McNabb6 2 -Malloryo rule of admissibil-
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
5Id. at 542; But see, Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv, 938 (1966).
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
°Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 550 (1942).
"Rochin v. California, supra note 49, at 177 (Justice Black dissent).
"McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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ity in the federal court system. The federal rule was a composite of the guar-
antees of the first ten amendments and Congressional mandate. 64 Its rele-
vance to this study of the demise of historic federalism, lies in the constant
overstatements of the Court in opinions utilizing the McNabb-Mallory rule
to distinguish federal justice from state justice. None would deny that the
interest of the two systems were alike in their beliefs that: "A democratic
society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally
guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process." 65 Yet, however
the ends coincided, the means remained diverse in the incrusted belief that:
"This experiment [exclusionary rule] has been made in an attempt to abol-
ish the opportunities for coercion" alone and "does not arise from Consti-
tutional sources." 66 This polarization of enforcement techniques, based on
the premise "that power over state criminal trials is not vested in this
Court"67 was rooted in the persistent view that:
... review by this Court of State action expressing its notion of what will best
further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appro-
priate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of
its jurisdiction.68
In the matter of confessorial admissibility therefore, the reasons behind the
Court's reticence remained much the same as those controlling in search and
seizure problems. Yet, while the basis was the same, the vehemence accom-
panying its reassertion in the area of confessions, increased. So intent was
the Court on preserving the exclusivity of state and national criminal juris-
prudence that the following incongruous observation was postulated:
Consideration of large policy in making the necessary accommodations in our
Federal System are wholly irrelevant to the formulation and application of
proper standards for the enforcement of Federal criminal law in the Federal
Courts.69
Historical federalism might require a diversity of procedure for continued
vitality but hardly the degree of separation dictated above. Carried to a con-
clusion, this theory of the irrelevancy of one system of criminal justice to
another, makes the Slaughter House division of citizenship seem timid.
Rather than revitalizing a federalistic rendition of criminal justice, this ir-
relevancy thesis would replace federalism with a system of separate despot-
isms akin to those under the Articles of Confederation. The result would be
" Supra notes 62, 63.
McNabb v. United States, supra note 62, at 343.
o Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953).
"Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 64 (1951).
McNabb v. United States, supra note 62, at 340.
Id. at 340-41.
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a censureless administration of criminal justice by both the national and
state judiciaries within their own spheres.
As the Articles of Confederation had proved to be a most impractical
method of governing the early colonies, so did this exclusivity theory of na-
tional and state criminal justice prove ineffective. The inadequacy of a non-
incorporative mode of censure by the Supreme Court of state criminal prose-
cutions had proven to be of:
... such uncertainty and unpredictability that it would be impossible to for-
tell--other than by guess work-just how brazen the invasion of the intimate pri-
vacies of one's home must be in order to shock itself into the protective arms of
the Constitution. In truth, the practical result of this ad hoc approach is simply
that when five Justices are sufficiently revolted by local police action, a convic-
tion is overturned and a guilty man may go free.70
In the October term of 1961, the Supreme Court finally set about the task of
substituting the dictates of the federal constitution for the individual sensi-
tivities of the Supreme Court Justices which had served as the only gover-
nors of state criminal practices in the past.
Mapp v. Ohio71 specifically overruled Wolf v. Colorado,7 2 holding that
the exclusionary rule announced in Weeks v. United States, 73 based on the
dictates of the fourth amendment of the national constitution, was now ef-
fective against the states. Criminal procedure, at least in the area of search
and seizure, would now have to proceed in terms of "a mutual obligation to
respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches." 74 The double
standard of the past years had placed state law enforcement practices in the
embarrassing posture "by admitting evidence unlawfully seized" or encourag-
ing "disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is bound to up-
hold."75 In Mapp, the Court not only annihilated the factual "considerations
supporting the failure of the Wolf Court to include the Weeks exclusionary
rule when it recognized the enforceability of the right of privacy against
the States"7 6 but also defined its action as "enforceable in the same manner
and the like effect as the other basic rights secured by the Due Process
Clause" 77 against state encroachment. The accordion-like 78 philosophy be-
hind efforts of defining the consistency of the fundamental rights had now
made a full circle, facilitating the adoption of the approach which it so ve-
70Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954).
- 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
' 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
- 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
71 Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 71, at 658.
7Id. at 657.
76 Id. at 653.
7 'Id. at 660.78Rochin v. California, supra note 49, at 177 (Justice Black dissent).
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hemently opposed. The difference in the utilization of that theory in Mapp,
however, lay in the intent of the Court to confine its censure within the con-
tour of the fourth amendment. Hopefully, the days of constitutional defini-
tion of an individual's fundamental rights on the basis of judicial sensitivi-
ties rather than the guarantees of the federal constitution were gone forever.
Mapp's relation to the question of the federal structure of the United
States is critical. Basically, the importance of the decision stems from the
non-preemptive tone in which the opinion was rendered. Rather than usurp-
ing the prerogatives of the individual states in the exclusion debate, the
Court characterized its action as dictated by "more than half [the states]
of those since passing upon it [Weeks' exclusionary rule] by their own legis-
lative or judicial decision, have wholly or partly adopted or had adhered
to the Weeks rule." 79 This plus the factor that other remedies geared to pro-
tect the individual from hostile invasions of privacy had proven futile, made
Mapp not only logical but necessary. The aim was "Federal-State coopera-
tion in the solution of crime under Constitutional standards ... by recogni-
tion of their now mutual obligations to respect the same fundamental cri-
teria in their approaches."80 The rationale of Mapp was:
.. founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice.S1
The implementation of federal constitutional guarantees in criminal pro-
cedures initiated in Mapp, was amplified by the Court in Gideon v. Wain-
wright.82 Accepting the earlier assumption in Betts v. Brady,83 that the "Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose
trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right,"8 4 Mr. Justice Black delivered the coup de grace to the "fundamental
test" of the due process clause regarding counsel observing:
... the Court in Betts was wrong, however in concluding that the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.85
The devastating simplicity of the Gideon opinion again emphasizes the
inherent weakness of pre-Mapp interpretations of the requirements of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. Not only did reversal, premised
on the "concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in the other
79 Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 71, at 651.
8oId. at 658.
Id. at 660.
-372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Supra note 55.
Id. at 473.
8Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 82, at 344.
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specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights"8 6 prove ineffective to
assure an individual's constitutional rights but by the facile manipulation
of the mainstay of this theory's vitality, i.e., the fundamental character of
the right involved, any court could view the first ten amendments as:
... so fundamental and essential to a fair trial and so, to due process of law, that
it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.8 7
Now, the presence of an individual guarantee in the first ten amendments
rather than immunizing state procedure under the "fundamental right test"
only emphasized that as:
* . .this right appears in .. .our Bill of Rights [it] reflects the belief of the
Framers of those liberties and safeguards that... [the right] was a fundamental
right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.8S
As indicated by Gideon, post-Mapp cases did not spring from an incor-
porative interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment alone. Rather, the later opinions preceded the curious amalgam of
two theories of constitutional due process which formerly had been mutual-
ly exclusive. On one hand, there existed the fundamental right theory of
constitutional censure. Under this system of effecting due process guarantees,
the constitutive states of the union were relatively free to choose the mode
which their enforcement practices would pursue. Opposite, there was an
incorporative theory of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
According to this view, state administration of criminal justice had to pass
a muster of the first eight amendments of the national constitution in order
to be deemed constitutionally acceptable. The synthesis of these two diverse
theories as evinced by later Supreme Court decisions did not, as the propo-
nents of the individual view points assured themselves, preserve the states
as a functional unit in the administration of constitutional criminal justice.
Instead, the Court adopted the rationale of both worlds of due process with-
out the attendant restrictions of either perspective. The result was the com-
plete obliteration of a federal structure of criminal procedures, with the
Court free to roam the landscape of criminal law which it had declared now
to be of limitless acreage.
The Court, intent on rejecting "the notion that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies to the States only a 'watered down version of the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights' "89 did not, in later cases, limit itself to the
text of the respective amendments in passing on the administration of crimi-
nal justice by the states. Given the prerogative of the individual states to
Betts v. Brady, supra note 55, at 462.
81 Malloy v, Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
as Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
8' Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 87, at 10-11.
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"consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences" in
criminal procedure, these differences could not "amount to a denial of Due
Process or an 'invidious discrimination.' "90 Thus, while certain amendments
might now be effective against the states, the Court did not deem itself
bound by them alone but continued to justify its actions on the basis of:
... strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacri-
ficed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction
rings the confession out of an accused against his will.91
From these two sources, the Court had endowed itself with a power over the
administration of criminal justice approaching limitless proportions. The
former minority, now the majority, goaded on by past defeats and the contin-
ued bumbling of state "kangaroo court proceedings ... [involving] depriva-
tion of due process of law... [denying] a person accused of committing a
crime ... vouchsafed basic minimal rights" 92 had finally secured the power
to overturn lower federal and state court decisions based on its "vast super-
visory powers" 93 alone.
The swan song of the federal structure of the nation was now completed.
Every aspect of state trials, from preliminary hearing,94 through appeal,9 5
including an evaluation of the publicity9 6 attendant thereon, was within the
ambit of the pervasive power of the Supreme Court. In 1964, Escobedo v.
Illinois,97 in combining the voluntary test,98 the supervisory power 99 of the
Court, and the right of the accused to be represented by counsel, 100 under-
scored the peonage of the state judiciaries to the Supreme Court by creating
the following rule controlling the admission of confessions:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect has been taken into police custody, the policy carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and
the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute right to remain silent,
the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth
10 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963).
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
92 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
3 Betts v. Brady, supra note 55, at 475 (Justice Black dissent).
94 Pointer v. Texas, supra note 88.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
1 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
" McNabb v. United States, supra note 62.
100 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 82.
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Amendment to the Constitution as made obligatory upon the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 101
Escobedo was redefined in Miranda v. Arizonal0 2 in 1966. The "recurrent
argument... that society's need for interrogation outweighs the privilege"' 03
again fell before the Court's reasoning "that the Constitution has prescribed
the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of the govern-
ment when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot
be compelled to be a witness against himself."'104 The relation of this opinion
to the problem of the decline of the nation's federal structure, lies in the dis-
claimer of Mr. Chief Justice Warren that the "Constitution... require[s] any
specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation."10 5 In the tradition of Marshall, the Chief Justice noted that the
Court had the power and the duty to define the basic guarantees of the con-
stitution but left the:
Congress and the States ... free to develop their own safeguards ... so long as
they are fully effective as those described above in informing accused persons of
the right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.106
What at first glance appears to be an effort to restore the state courts to their
previous status in criminal law, is upon further examination of attached pro-
visos of little restitutive value. The "States are still entirely free to effectu-
ate under their own law" standards of criminal procedure. But those stand-
ards can only be "stricter standards than those which we have laid down."' 07
Additionally, the self ordained duty of the Court "as in all our cases deal-
ing with the question whether a confession was involuntarily given, to ex-
amine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ul-
timate issue of voluntariness"' 08 severely endangers the efficacy and finality
of state criminal adjudications.
The effect of the power possessed by the Court on the federal system of
law enforcement while identifiable from past deicions, is by no means a
moot question. As indicated by Schmerber v. California,°9 it is possible that
the Court may, in the future, defer to state determinations of what is consti-
tutionally reasonable. If such is the case, the federal system of criminal law
processes will not only be revitalized but will be significantly superior to the
non-incorporative rationale of the past. Yet so long as the view persists that
151 Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 97, at 490.
3 884 U.S. 436 (1966).
l Id. at 479; citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1940).
101 Id. at 479.
1o6 Id. at 490.
:0 Ibid.
"" Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966).
108Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741-42 (1966).
'-384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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"the concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental,
and is not confined by the Bill of Rights," 11 the Court, in applying the "pe-
numbras, formed by the emanations from those guarantees that helped give
them [the first ten amendments] life and substance," '111 will only be limited
by its own judicial fiat. The result of:
... the adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws
unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitu-
tional shift of power to the courts... which will be bad for the courts and worse
for the country."12
uO Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). (Justice Goldberg concurring).
mid. at 484 (Justice Douglas, majority opinion).
Id. at 521 (Justice Black dissent).
